Restraint by Paterson, Brodie
Chapter 14 
 
Paterson B. Restraint, seclusion and compulsory medication.  In Barker P  (Ed) Mental 
Health Ethics: The Human Context, Routledge, London.2010 
 
 
Introduction.  
 
“Our science enables us to call your madness illness and diagnose a madness in 
you that prevents you being a patient like other patients: hence you will be a 
mental patient” 1  
 
Unlike most other medical specialists, psychiatrists have the legal power to 
coerce patients into accepting treatment.  
 
In a UK post asylum era, focused on facilitating recovery through partnership with 
service users, not just in treatment but also in the design, delivery and evaluation 
of services, it is tempting to suggest that the complex ethical questions about 
coercion in treatment are somehow less relevant or less important than they 
once were. Unfortunately nothing could be further from the truth because 
coercion in its various forms continues to play a central role in mental health 
practice both in the UK and across the world.  This chapter will briefly explore the 
history of coercive practice in mental health, and discuss its use in contemporary 
practice. However, its primary focus will be on an evaluation of whether and if so 
how, the continued use of restraint, seclusion and compulsory medication can be 
justified ethically?  For the purpose of this chapter however both seclusion and 
compulsory medication will be considered sub types of restraint.  Seclusion, 
because substituting a locked door for a restraining hand or belt merely replaces 
one means of restricting movement with another. Compulsory medication -
particularly rapid tranquilization - because “a medication used to control 
behaviour or to restrict a patients freedom of movement, is in reality “not 
treatment but restraint”.2 The focus of the discussion will be on their use in 
services for working age adults but it is acknowledged that such interventions are 
used in other services.  
 
As Thomas Szasz3 observed state legitimized coercive interventions whilst 
“always morally problematic” are also always  “inherently political in nature”. This 
chapter eschews therefore the use of a more conventional ethical framework in 
favor of two post modernist constructions of validity, the „pragmatic‟ and the 
„psychopolitical‟. The decision to do so requires however some justification for 
those unfamiliar with this approach. Validity as a concept has several well known 
dimensions  central to the positivist tradition in research in the behavioural 
sciences, particularly „content‟, „construct‟ and „predictive‟ validity.4 This 
„traditional‟ construction of validity reflects a modernist worldview, whereby 
knowledge provides a map of a reality, which is assumed to be objective. If 
instead an alternative post-modern worldview is taken the search for certainty in 
knowledge is replaced by that of identifying defensible „claims‟ regarding all 
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knowledge. Validation then becomes the process of choosing among competing 
interpretations each framed as potentially falsifiable and thus open to 
exploration.5  Truth in this context is not defined with reference to an objective 
reality but retains significant value as a concept, albeit  interpreted now, in terms 
not of accuracy, but of utility, in the sense of “whatever assists us to take actions 
that produce the desired results”.6 The process however, whereby “the results 
desired” are agreed upon, involves consideration of both values and ethics. The 
consequence is that validity itself becomes an ethical question and it is this 
perspective, which will inform the exercise undertaken.7   
 
The Coercion Continuum 
Before such an exploration can be conducted it is however necessary to clarify 
what coercion involves and describe contemporary practice in the area. Coercion 
is defined for purposes of this chapter as “any action or threat of actions, which 
compels the patient to behave in a manner inconsistent with his own wishes”. 8 It 
exists on a continuum and can be overt and explicit such as the use of restraint 
(whether accomplished by means of physical holding or mechanical device) 
seclusion (whether accomplished through locked doors or threats to enforce 
isolation) or „as required medication‟ administered in the absence of consent. It 
can also be implicit. The suggestion that if medication is not taken „orally other 
options will have be explored‟ is readily understood as a barely veiled threat by 
the service user in many mental health in-patient services.   
 
The latter appears most common with 48% per cent of service users who 
responded to an audit of English in-patient services agreeing that “they felt that 
the threat of medication or seclusion was used to control behaviour‟.9 Such 
threats are clearly not idle, in the first national audit 8% of inpatients in England 
and Wales were reported to have been restrained at least once during their 
current stay in hospital. With one point five per cent having been restrained more 
than 5 times and 0.7% restrained on more than 10 occasions. Seclusion was less 
common with 3% of patients reported as having been secluded at least once.9 
 
Similar and sometimes much higher figures for the use coercive interventions are 
reported across Europe and the rest of the world10 although remarkable variation 
in the specific type of coercion used exists.11 The use of mechanical restraint is 
almost unknown now in the UK but remains common practice in much of Europe 
,with less common variations such as the use of net beds ( large cot type 
structures) in widespread use in Austria. Seclusion, used in much of Europe, is 
banned in Italy. Compulsory medication in the form of rapid tranquilization is 
however it appears used almost every where.11 Such variation in an era of 
evidence based practice and common European guidance12 requiring that 
services adopt and implement the principles of least restrictive environment and 
least intrusive treatment may seem surprising. The pattern and frequency of use 
of such interventions reflects however the gradual emergence over time of 
consensus on what represents acceptable practice, which have eventually 
become enshrined in local and sometimes national guidance. 13 These are not 
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evidence based interventions but forms of  „custom and practice' reflecting local 
culture hence the variation.13 Ultimately, these practices represent value 
judgements. This is best illustrated perhaps with reference to an example in 
British Colonial India. When the non-restraint movement swept the UK in the 
1800‟s many British psychiatrists came to view mechanical restraint as archaic 
and sought to eliminate it. Interestingly however, British psychiatrists practising in 
India during the colonial period dissented vehemently. This was not because they 
saw mechanical restraint as necessary to control the „native‟ population. Rather, 
it was because the public institutions for the insane, which catered for European 
colonials, employed only Indian orderlies and nurses. In practice such direct care 
staff (as today) were largely responsible for managing aggressive and violent 
patients.  The discourse then prevalent made mechanical restraint essential for 
British patients because it avoided what, for a British patient, would have been 
profoundly shaming in that culture, at that time: i.e. physical domination by 
„native‟ orderlies.14 What practitioners judged „reasonable‟ and thus acceptable 
reflected the local cultural imperatives.  Whilst the nature of these imperatives will 
vary over time and place, the process by which it is decided which coercive 
interventions are used remains the same, explaining the wide variations in 
practice observed. 
 
Coercion: A brief history 
The use of coercion to manage acute mental distress is not new, predating both 
the development of the asylum and psychiatry itself.  The origins of organised 
care in mental health stem in part from desires to protect those vulnerable to 
abuse and exploitation from the public but also to protect the public from those 
whose behaviour was perceived as representing a threat to themselves or 
others, or to the broader social order. Legal provisions in England dating back to 
at least the 14th century have provided for the “imprisonment of a lunatic”.15 Such 
legislation permitted not only for detention but that they might “bind him and beat 
him with rods” not as punishment but in an attempt to restore sanity. 16 The use 
of coercion in the form of mechanical restraint to protect staff from dangerous 
behaviour was however also commonplace. Michael Foucault 17 records that a 
variety of “marvelous instruments”, including the “fixed chair”, “handcuffs, muffs 
straitjacket” the “fingerglove garment” and “wicker caskets in which individuals 
were enclosed” were in widespread use in French hospitals before the actions of 
Pinel at the Bicetre called them into question. It has been suggested that Pinel, 
while widely credited with freeing lunatics from their chains, remained 
comfortable with threatening patients with the camisole or gilet de force (the 
straightjacket) and considered the effects achieved by such intimidation justified 
to gain compliance. 18 
 
The practice of coercion also came to be questioned in the UK.   Inspired initially 
by the treatment of a fellow Quaker admitted to York asylum in England and his 
horror at the conditions he subsequently found there William Tuke went on to 
establish „The Retreat‟, a service based on the principles of „moral treatment‟. 
(See Chapters 2 and 3). A critical element of moral treatment was “A system 
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which, by limiting the power of the attendant” made  “it his interest to obtain the 
good opinion of those under his care”. This approach, Tuke argued, provided 
more “effectually for the safety of the keeper, as well as of the patient” than any “ 
chains, darkness, and anodynes”. 19 
 
In a bizarre irony, because Tuke rejected the medical treatment of insanity as 
ineffective, „moral treatment‟ came to be adopted by medical campaigners in 
favour of the asylums. They were eventually successful in entwining the notion of 
cure with the concept of the „benign institution” 20. Later advocates of what 
eventually became known as „non restraint‟ in the new system of asylums, which 
developed in the UK during the 19th century, including James Connolly, 21 were 
however subject to considerable criticism. Concerns were expressed about 
'serious physical effects (such as broken ribs,)' sustained by staff in struggles 
with service users in at least one asylum.22 Non-restraint was therefore never 
universally popular or adopted everywhere despite the somewhat mythical status 
it has since came to enjoy.22 Although mechanical restraint did fall out of favour 
in the UK, at least for adults of working age, physical restraint, strong clothing 
and „strong rooms‟ (later renamed seclusion) remained part of common practice 
in many British institutions and elsewhere throughout the 19th  and 20th century.24 
 
The debate over the use of compulsion in services for people with mental health 
needs is therefore far from new.   The dominant conceptualisation of validity 
adopted by those who support the need for seclusion, restraint and compulsory 
medication even if only implicitly, can be described as „pragmatic'. Kvale 25 
asserts that, in a pragmatic construction of validity, the need for theoretical 
“justification is effectively superseded by application”. In the context of the use of 
coercion in-patient mental health in-patient services interventions that „worked‟ in 
terms of their effectiveness in producing the desired results (e.g. improving 
service users mental health; reducing injuries to staff; or even increasing the 
likelihood of future compliance with „treatment‟ for fear of repetition, might 
therefore be considered to enjoy pragmatic validity). Unfortunately whist we may 
know which combinations of „as required medication‟ can achieve rapid 
tranquilization most effectively, and with fewer adverse effects, 26 evidence of the 
effectiveness of restraint and seclusion, as systematic review indicates, is at best 
ambiguous. 27 
 
 
Justifying Coercion 
This legal justification for the use of restraint, seclusion, or compulsory 
medication is that such forms of coercion represent forms of necessary 
„treatment‟ so that staff can fulfil their „duty of care‟ and 'ensure that control is 
exercised over the patients‟. 28 It has been suggested that coercive interventions 
might be more usefully understood not as part of „treatment‟ but instead as 
indicative of “treatment failures,” suggesting a need to urgently review the care 
delivered.11 In English law however, a treatment need not be effective to be 
considered „lawful‟ and can even be harmful. 29 
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An in-patient unit in which service users were free to refuse all medication, to 
refuse to have their persons or their rooms searched for contraband items such 
as illegal drugs might in certain circumstances spiral out of control leading to an 
unsafe environment for both staff and service users. Mental health in-patient 
settings consistently emerge from research as potentially violence prone. 30,31 
Such a situation calls for staff to be trained in restraint and rapid tranquilization, 
and the case for the use of seclusion, once in decline, to be revisited, as an 
option can seem compelling. Coercion in this framing of the problem is 
represented as undesirable but “progress in treatment can only be expected if 
safety has been established,” 32 According to this justification, restraint, seclusion 
and „„as required medication‟‟ are therefore „regrettable necessities‟, used only 
with extreme reluctance, as an absolute last resort to manage dangerous 
behaviour arising from the service users‟ „mental illness‟, which poses a serious 
risk to the safety of the service user or others.  
 
Suggestions however, that restraint, seclusion or as required compulsory 
medication actually „work‟ in terms of improving safety is however scant. 
Evidence for the necessity of restraint must be considered, therefore, in the light 
of evidence garnered largely from studies on the effects of training.33  
There are potentially strong arguments in favour of training in restraint as part of 
wider training in the prevention of violence.  
 
Fisher34 argued that restraint can prevent: imminent harm to self or others; 
substantial damage to the physical environment; and the serious disruption of 
treatment programmes. It can also decrease stimulation. He has also raised the 
issue that it may be valuable when implemented in response to service user 
requests.   
 
Lee et al‟s35 review found that the literature indicates several potential benefits 
arising from the introduction of structured training in physical restraint including 
an increase in staff confidence, a decrease in the seriousness of assaults and 
assault related injuries and a decrease in the levels of fear expressed by staff 
when interacting with patients. Reductions in the use of restraint following 
training have also been reported.36  
 
Unfortunately, as Allen37 observes negative outcomes have also been found with 
all these measures. In the UK one explanation offered for the negative results 
associated with training has been that the  'importing' of training models from non 
health service (prison) led to a widespread and persistent overemphasis on 
physical intervention during training in the prevention and management of 
violence in some programs.38 Unfortunately, this led to the neglect of training in 
interpersonal skills and the wider aspects of violence prevention.  Such training 
was it appears misconstrued as a „stand alone‟ intervention: i.e. it was interpreted 
as capable by itself of resolving the problems of workplace violence rather than 
as a necessary, but discrete, component of a total organisational commitment to 
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a public health model.39   This led, at least in some settings to the development of 
service cultures in which nurses were “trained to expect violence and how to 
react it but not how to stop it happening". 40 Such approaches it is suggested  
contributed to the emergence of a "culture of violence in mental health care in the 
UK”. 40  
 
Framing the problem of safety in mental health services as one that can be 
solved by increased control, whether by restraint, seclusion or compulsory 
medication, is at best simplistic if not profoundly misleading. An emerging body of 
research into the perceptions of service users around coercion suggests that 
many consider it is being used to punish rather than enable treatment, or 
manage high risk behaviours.41  Given the history of mental health services this 
is unsurprising. The use of systematic punishment to induce compliance was 
once orthodox practice, and threats of such „punishment‟ as service users 
perceive it are clearly commonplace.  The belief that “fear (is) the most effectual 
principle to reduce the insane to orderly conduct” may have appalled Daniel 
Tuke42 in the 19th century. However, to assume that such long established 
discourses no longer exert any influence on practice would be naive. As 
Shapiro43 observed it is precisely because such discourses are so familiar that 
they are able „operate transparently‟. Those affected are effectively blinded to 
such influences on both their thinking and behaviour.     
 
In settings where the needs of service users have become superseded by the 
needs of the culture for order, routine, predictability and deference to power, the 
misuse of such interventions to enforce compliance, can easily become 
commonplace. Wardhaugh and Wilding44 have described this process as  “An 
active betrayal of the values upon which the organisation is supposedly based” In 
such services „the primary aims of care have become subordinate to what are 
essentially secondary aims such as the preservation of order, quiet and 
cleanliness‟.45 The problem is that giving permission to staff to use such 
interventions whose subtle (or not so subtle) misuse under the guise of treatment 
has long been identified as a key factor in the development of corrupted cultures, 
which can then become self perpetuating.46  Over time a range of explanations 
have been offered as to the origins of what we presently choose to describe as 
„mental health needs‟ or „problems‟. Amongst the lesser known is the 
phenomenon of the 'insane ear'.  A characteristic swelling of the ear lobe was 
once  thought by some asylum physicians in the early 19th century to be a 
symptom of the long sought physiological basis of insanity.47 It took William 
Tuke19 to suggest a somewhat more prosaic explanation.  In what might be 
described as an early epidemiological study he noted the phenomenon now 
described as  „haematoma auris‟, occurred much more frequently in the left ear of 
„disruptive‟ male patients than their right. This led him to suggest that this was 
more to do the majority of asylum attendants being right handed than any 
underlying propensity in the population to the condition known more colloquially 
in the UK as „cauliflower ear‟. 
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Considering Alternatives 
If the problem of violence or other disturbed behaviour is framed as something to 
be controlled, needing restraint, seclusion and rapid tranquilization, what are the 
alternatives?  Prillenetsky48 asserts that a focus on causation is of critical 
importance. He has criticised approaches to defining and/or assessing validity, 
which focus merely on „what works‟, arguing that implicit to such approaches is a 
reductionist perspective on pathology, which neglects the social dimensions of 
causation. This he observes neglects the potential for the transformation of the 
conditions that may have given rise to the phenomena in question, typically in 
this case violence in inpatient mental health settings. Instead, he argues in favour 
of a model of validity which he terms „psychopolitical‟ arguing that interventions 
must be judged on the extent to which they seek to transform the conditions that 
give rise to the problem.48 To qualify as psychopolitically valid an intervention 
must: 
 
 recognize and challenge inequalities of power and their negative effects 
on both service users and staff 
 help to prevent the acting out of ones own oppression on others 
 build awareness of internalised oppression  
 illustrate and challenge dominant discourses that promote victim blaming 
 challenge collusion with exploitative systems, the causative role  of these 
inequalities in terms of their impact on communities and individuals and 
the need for interventions to address such inequalities 
 contribute towards the struggle to establish and sustain a positive 
individual identity 
 
This perspective on validity prompts a focus on primary prevention and 
consideration of the structural determinants of violence that might otherwise be 
neglected. Irrespective of the setting common reactions in staff exposed to 
aggression and violence include fear, frustration and anger. Unless recognized 
and constructively managed such feelings can influence their future interactions 
with patients and other staff.  Counter transference, in the form of the adoption of 
aggressive coping styles by staff can then embed a cycle of retaliation and 
revenge in the culture.49 Counter transference by staff can however, have roots 
other than in violence by service users. Bowie50 proposes an extension to the 
violence typology proposed by the California Division of Occupational Safety and 
Health i.e. 
 
Type 1 intrusive violence: Criminal intent by strangers‟ terrorist acts 
mental illness or drug related aggression and protest violence  
Type 2 consumer related violence: Consumer, clients, patients (and 
family) violence against staff, vicarious trauma to staff, staff violence to clients  
and consumers 
Type 3 relationship violence: Staff-on-staff violence and bullying domestic 
violence at work 
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Bowie proposes a further „Type 4‟ category, which he suggests, comprises 
„organisational violence‟ i.e. that which „the organisation‟ perpetrates against 
consumers, clients and patients.50 Direct care staff in many services are 
invariably at the lowest point in organisational hierarchies, often marked by rigid 
boundaries.51 These hierarchies can however all too readily foster the 
development of abusive, bullying or „toxic‟ cultures. The central dynamic of such 
toxic organisations is a culture of shame and humiliation, which can be pursued 
actively or allowed to happen by default.51  Workers (and even whole professional 
groups) at the bottom of hierarchies can become acutely sensitised to any 
perceived threat to their limited degree of status and self-esteem.  One 
consequence is that, low-level verbal abuse, or even non-compliance by a 
service user, can evoke a disproportionate emotional response because of the 
implicit threat to the staff member‟s vulnerable self-esteem. Restraint, seclusion 
and/or „as required‟ medication provide an all too ready means for staff to 
exorcise such feelings by controlling, punishing and humiliating the service 
user.53 
 
Actual or threatened violence is the most commonly reason reported reason for 
the use of seclusion, restraint or rapid tranquilization in mental health in-patient 
services. However, such violence appears much more often to escalate from low 
level conflict related to rules, rather than stemming directly from the individual‟s 
pathology.54  The use of restraint, seclusion or „„as required medication‟ in 
services for people with mental health needs must therefore be understood as 
arising not simply from the pathology of the individual, however construed but as 
stemming from the pathology of a society whose individualising and victim 
blaming processes the service cultures may simply replicate.  
 
To reduce the use of coercive measures transformative interventions are 
required48 These focus on the primary prevention of violence, recognising and 
addressing the central role the culture of individual mental health services should 
play in preventing violence. The underlying reasons for violence in in-patient 
settings often lie in structural inequalities of power, the unrecognised affects of 
trauma on both service users and staff, and the failure to develop supportive and 
therapeutic cultures. The potential effectiveness of system wide meta-
interventions complemented by targeted training in crisis management to reduce 
restraint and seclusion has now been convincingly demonstrated.55,56,57,58 David 
Colton has produced a checklist for services contemplating pursuing restraint 
and seclusion reduction, to assess their readiness to implement such initiatives. 
59 
 
Key Ethical Dilemmas 
Even where the root causes of violence have been identified and addressed 
there may still be situations where coercion occurs. Whether or not to restrain, 
seclude or medicate patients can present staff with a decision dilemma for 
nursing staff, where they attempt to manage the risks to all involved including 
themselves. In such circumstances, nurses may regard the conflicting choices of 
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intervention / non-intervention as equally unwelcome options.60 However, there 
remain scenarios where restraint, seclusion or rapid tranquilization may be 
warranted in exceptional circumstances. 
 
 A service user diagnosed with bi polar disorder who is experiencing an 
acute crisis has repeatedly refused oral medication. She is manifestly 
psychotic, delusional, and evidently pyrexic, appears acutely dehydrated 
and repeatedly refuses fluids. She is reported as not having slept for 72 
hours. Her physical health will rapidly deteriorate in such circumstances. 
Should staff decline to enforce medication ? 
 
 A service user detained under mental health legislation refuses access to 
his/her room by standing in front of the door obstructing the planned 
search of a room carried out as part of a „random search‟ strategy in a 
medium or high secure service. The service user has a previous history of 
constructing and using weapons. Should staff physically restrain him to 
permit the search?  
 
 A service user with a diagnosis of anorexia refuses to accept oral 
supplements or oral sedation to permit intravenous feeding.  Medical 
opinion is that without rapid intervention she will die within days or weeks. 
Should staff restrain her to administer treatment? 
 
 An acutely psychotic young service user, also diagnosed with autistic 
spectrum disorder, struggles badly to manage his symptoms in an acute 
in-patient unit which can be noisy and sometime chaotic. When acutely 
distressed he aggressively confronts other service users and will 
repeatedly attempt assault. If physically restrained he reacts badly 
continuing to struggle for long periods causing staff serious anxiety that he 
may experience acidosis and suffer cardiac arrest. If secluded the low 
stimulus environment appears to help him calm. Should staff seclude him? 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a new restraint reduction movement 
whose aims include the reduction of all forms of coercion. This movement has 
explicitly sought to reframe the problem of violence towards staff and to 
challenge what it has described as the almost exclusive focus on the pathology 
of the individual resulting from the dominance of biological psychiatry and the 
near demise of social psychiatry. In seeking to reduce recourse to coercion it has 
argued that the root causes of the behaviors leading to such interventions can 
often be found in what services do to both service users and staff. The role of the 
organization is thus increasingly recognized as of critical importance (See also 
Chs 8 and 23).  
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There is now persuasive evidence that multidimensional meta-interventions are 
capable of significantly reducing the use of seclusion, restraint and as required 
compulsory medication. As the examples above illustrate, it may be impossible to 
eliminate the use of such interventions in all settings. However, it may be 
possible to reduce them significantly in most. It is also clear that that such 
reduction strategies offer the most effective route to making mental health in-
patient settings users safer for both service users and staff. Given such clear 
evidence, and the legal requirement now imposed on many European countries 
to provide services in the „least restrictive manner‟, any service, which fails to 
attempt to reduce the use of such interventions must offer god reason.  
 
It may be apt to end with the words of a service user, once a mental health 
nurse, who may be uniquely qualified to comment. Discussing his experience of 
restraint he observed: 
 
“For me the real issue is not so much about restraint per se, but about restraint 
carried out by people who think restraining a patient is not a violent act. There 
may be times when it is a necessary violent act. A person who knows this, and 
believes violence to be basically wrong, will strive to minimise the violence. A 
person who thinks restraining a patient is not a violent act will not. They will also 
not understand why someone would be upset by being restrained and will not be 
in a position to deal with that upset in a positive way”. 61 
 
 
 
Coercive interventions remain commonplace in mental health but can be open to 
abuse in the corrupted cultures that continue to exist in some in-patient settings 
 
Coercive interventions can be significantly reduced in most in-patient settings via 
meta-interventions that start by reframing the problem of violence toward staff 
 
All services should be required to publish their rates of restraint, seclusion and 
compulsory medication. Such transparency would do much to encourage 
services to reduce their use 
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